期刊文献+

跨界水冲突博弈分析 被引量:19

Game analysis of transboundary water conflict
下载PDF
导出
摘要 基于博弈论和最优化方法,考虑冲突参与人的非合作与合作行为、水资源的量与质、以及河道最小生态需水要求,建立了二人博弈分析模型。以官厅水库流域张家口市和北京市跨界的水量和水质冲突为例,探讨冲突过程中参与人决策的相互影响以及达到合作所需要的利益分配格局。研究结果表明:张家口和北京跨界水冲突的均衡结果是(非合作,非合作)的劣解,为改进到(合作,合作)的帕累托最优解,可对合作增加利益的公平分配实现:P=50%水文年型下,均衡结果的上游盈利为8.03亿元/a,下游为0元/a,通过下游给上游的旁支付(私下支付)10.41亿元/a,结果可改进到上游盈利为15.61亿元/a,下游为7.59亿元/a;P=95%水文年型下,下游给上游的旁支付为3.32亿元/a,合作后盈利分别改进到7.97亿元/a和0.28亿元/a。 Considering a series of influence factors such as the cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors by conflict participants,the quality and quantity of water resource and the minimum instream ecological water demand,a two-person game analysis model was built to solve the transboundary water conflict on water quality and quantity based on the game theory and optimal approach.The transboundary water conflict on water quantity and quality of the Guanting Reservoir Basin between the Zhangjiakou and Beijing city is taken as a case study.The interactive infulence between conflict participants in their decision-making and the related profit distribution pattern for cooperation were explored.The results show that the double non-cooperative may lead to an inferior solution.In order to obtain a double cooperation optimal solution,a fair distribution of the increased profits on cooperation is necessary.Under P=50% water year pattern,the profits were estimated as 803×106 and zero Yuan/a for upstream and downstream consumers respectively.If the downstream participant pays 1 041×106 Yuan/a to the upstream participant,the profits will be improved as 1 561×106 and 759×106 Yuan/a for upstream and downstream consumers respectively.Under P = 95% water year pattern,if the downstream participant pays 3.32×106 Yuan/a to the upstream participant,the profits will be improved as 7.97×106 Yuan/a and 0.28×106 Yuan/a for upstream and downstream consumers respectively
作者 曾勇
出处 《水利学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2011年第2期204-210,共7页 Journal of Hydraulic Engineering
基金 国家教育部博士点新教师基金资助(200804251002)
关键词 跨界 水量和水质冲突 博弈论 冲突协调 官厅水库流域 transboundary water conflict water quantity and quality game theory Guantin Reservoir watershed
  • 相关文献

参考文献15

  • 1张德.组织行为学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,1999.. 被引量:43
  • 2Cai X, Lasdon L, Micheisen A M . Group decision making in water resources planning using multiple objective malysis [ J ] . Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 2004, 130 ( 1 ) : 4-14. 被引量:1
  • 3Soncini S R, Canuti D, Colorni A. Use of muhi-criteria analysis to resolve conflicts in the operation of a transnational multipurpose water system- the case of lake verbano (Italy-Switzerland) [J ] . Water International, 2000, 25(3): 334-346. 被引量:1
  • 4张维迎.博奕论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996.. 被引量:33
  • 5Rogers P. A game theory approach to the problems of international river basins [J] . Water Resources Rresearch . 1969, 5(4): 749-760. 被引量:1
  • 6Rogers P. The value of cooperation in resolving international river basin disputes [J ] . Natural Resources Forum, 1993, 17(2): 117-131 . 被引量:1
  • 7Hcancy J P, Dickinson R E. Methods for apportioning the cost of a water resource project[J] . Water Resources Research, 1982, 18: 476-482. 被引量:1
  • 8Tisdell J G, Harrison S R . Estimating an optimal distribution of water entitlements [J] . Water Resources Research, 1992, 28(12): 3111-3117. 被引量:1
  • 9Becker Nir, Easter K W. Water diversion from the great lakes: is a cooperative approach possible? [ J ] . Water Resources Development, 1997, 13( 1 ): 53-65 . 被引量:1
  • 10Wu X, Whittington D. Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: A case study of the Nile Basin[J] . Water Resources Research, 2006, 42, W02417 . 被引量:1

二级参考文献28

共引文献103

同被引文献208

引证文献19

二级引证文献81

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部