摘要
针对初始排污权总量分配的实际问题,基于统一价格拍卖的思想提出了一种具有激励性的可变总量的分配方法,分别给出了排污企业对称和排污企业非对称两种情形下的线性均衡报价策略,并证明了该方法的可行性和有效性,从而为建设排污权分配和交易制度提供了理论依据和方法参考.
This paper researches the problem of allocating initial emission permits. Based on the uniform price auction of divisible goods, an incentive allocation method with variable supply is presented. Then, the linear equilibrium bidding strategies of this new method are given respectively based on two different conditions, i.e., the polluting enterprises are symmetrical and the polluting enterprises are asymmetrical, and the feasibility and validity of this allocation method are proved. Therefore, this method will provide valuable theoretical basis and guidance for building the pollution emission permits trade system.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第3期48-55,共8页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(70771041)
湖北省教育厅优秀中青年人才项目(Q20202904)
关键词
初始排污权分配
统一价格拍卖
均衡策略
initial emission permits allocation
uniform price auction
equilibrium strategies
