摘要
将约定担保费率和实际担保费率的差额即担保费节约额的分配作为激励机制,同时考虑互助性担保组织内被担保企业相关程度因素,分析互助性信用担保运行机理。得到如下结论:在信息不对称情况下,被担保中小企业间担保费节约额的相关程度与互助性信用担保对中小企业的激励强度呈正向变化;互助性信用担保与非互助性信用担保相比,利于提高信用担保的激励强度,提高中小企业的努力水平,利于节约代理成本。
By using the allocation of guarantee rate saving as incentive mechanism and introducing the influence coefficient of the SMEs in mutual guarantee organization,the operational mechanism of mutual credit guarantee has been investigated in this paper.It has been found out that the relativity of guarantee cost saving for SMEs is changing positively with the incentive intensity of mutual credit guarantee to SME;compared with non-mutual credit guarantee,it is beneficial for mutual credit guarantee to raise the incentive intensity and the effort level of SMEs and to save agent cost under asymmetric information.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
2010年第12期1873-1877,共5页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20090042110033)
辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L09BJY016)
辽宁科学技术计划资助项目(2008401010)
