摘要
基于企业内部资本配置的理论阐释,以无风险资产和风险性资产的组合投资为研究对象,从控股股东无偿占用上市公司内部资金的角度构建企业价值期权模型,探析控股股东的现金流权、现金流权与控制权分离度对资本配置决策和企业价值的影响。研究结果表明,控股股东的现金流权与企业资本配置效率正相关,与企业价值正相关;现金流权与控制权分离度与企业资本的配置效率负相关,也与企业价值负相关;并且发现,由大股东侵占而产生的对风险性资产的非效率"挤占"是导致上市企业资本配置行为扭曲的一个重要动因。
Based on the theory of capital allocation and assignment in companies,from the perspective of risky assets and safe assets,this paper incorporates the factor of large shareholders into real option model to analyze the effect of cash-flow rights of the large shareholders and the separation of cash-flow rights from control on the capital allocation and firm valuations.The conclusions show that,capital allocation efficiency is positive correlative with the cash-flow rights of the large shareholders,but negative correlative with the separation of cash-flow rights from control;the corporate value is positive correlative with the cash-flow rights of the large shareholders,and also negative correlative with the separation of cash-flow rights from control.Otherwise,we find the large shareholder＇s expropriation leads to listed companies inefficiently decrease risky asset investment.Moreover,it is also one of the most important reasons leading to distortion and inefficiency of capital allocation
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期147-154,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100)
教育部博士点基金资助项目(教技发中心函[2006]226号)
广东省教育厅人文社科研究项目(WYM08043)
关键词
大股东侵占
资本配置
组合投资
现金流权与控制权分离
large shareholder＇s expropriation
capital allocation
portfolio investment
separation of cash-flow rights from control
