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消费者保障计划的作用机理——基于信号博弈的理论分析 被引量:5

The Operation Mechanism of Consumer Protection Programs:Base on the Signal Game
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摘要 信息不对称是阻碍电子商务进一步发展的关键问题。消费者保障计划是淘宝网在2007年推出的一种交易机制,旨在解决网上交易信任问题。本文运用信号博弈理论分析了该机制中的"先行赔付"计划和"7天无理由退换货"计划在网上交易中的作用机理,并据此讨论了各种因素对分离均衡产生及卖家利润的影响,比较了两种计划在降低消费者购买风险方面所起到的不同作用,为该机制的使用和完善提供了理论参考。 Information asymmetry is the critical issues facing current C2C e-commerce.Because the legal mechanisms in electronic markets in our country are still not complete,the rules of transaction in C2C e-commerce are relying on some extralegal mechanisms.In order to increase the trust between buyers and sellers,Taobao.com launched a new mechanism-Buyer Protection Programs in 2007.This paper studies how the "7-Day" program and the "indemnity in advance" in BPPs can signal product quality in online trading.Based on the conclusion,this paper analyzes the effect of some factors on the separating equilibrium and the profits of high-quality sellers.Finally,this paper compares the different effect of the two BPPs in reducing the risk of purchases.All the results of this work provide an important reference for understanding and completing the trust mechanisms in online trading.
作者 刘玲 肖俊极
出处 《南方经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第12期43-59,共17页 South China Journal of Economics
关键词 消费者保障计划 网上交易 信号博弈 分离均衡 Buyers Protection Program Online Trading Signal Game Separating Equilibrium
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参考文献22

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共引文献333

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