摘要
文章在对国内外相关文献进行梳理的基础上,分析了特许权价值自律效应的形成机理,在此基础上以不良贷款率、贷款损失准备金率和净资产收益率作为衡量银行稳健性的被解释变量,以基于托宾Q值计算的各上市银行的特许权价值及资产规模、财务杠杆、资本杠杆等为解释变量,对中国上市银行以政府监管、隐性保险为虚拟变量,构建特许权价值和银行稳健性的计量经济模型,并采用中国14家上市银行2000-2009年的非平衡面板数据进行实证分析。研究发现,特许权价值越高,其自律作用越明显,银行的稳健性越好;隐性保险制度削弱了特许权价值对银行稳健经营的促进作用,并且隐性保险对我国商业银行的保护和其所有制形式无关;银行规模越大越不容易倒闭。因此,可以通过提高银行自身核心竞争力、引入显性保险制度和加强政府监管等措施提高银行特许权价值,以增强银行的稳健性。
Based on the domestic and foreign literature,this paper analyzes the formation mechanism of the self-regulation effect of franchise value.It constructs an econometric model of franchise value and bank stability by taking bank stability,which is measured by non-performing loan ratio,loan loss reserve ratio and ROE,as dependent variable,franchise value on the basis of Tobin＇ Q,asset size,financial leverage and capital leverage as independent variables,and government regulation and implicit insurance as dummy variables.Then it makes an empirical study based on the unbalanced panel data of 14 listed banks from 2000 to 2009.The results show that：a）with higher franchise values,the self-regulation effects of banks are more significant and their stability is better;b）implicit insurance system offsets the positive effect of franchise value on bank stability to some extent and is not related to the protection of commercial banks and their ownership forms;c）the bank with bigger size is less likely to collapse.Therefore,is can raise banks＇ franchise values and enhance their stability by the improvement of banks＇ core competitiveness,the introduction of explicit insurance system and the reinforcement of government regulation.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第12期62-71,共10页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目(09YJA790033)
国家社会科学基金项目(10BJL044)
关键词
特许权价值
银行稳健性
银行规模
政府监管
隐性保险
franchise value
bank stability
bank size
government regulation
implicit insurance
