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虚拟计算环境中基于重复博弈的惩罚激励机制 被引量:12

Repeated Game Theory Based Penalty-Incentive Mechanism in Internet-Based Virtual Computing Environment
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摘要 如何促进网络中自主元素自觉规范行为、积极有序协作从而形成"可信的计算平台"是下一代互联网亟需解决的重点问题.提出一种基于重复博弈的惩罚激励机制PETrust,旨在有效促进自主元素采取系统期望的诚实协作策略进行规范行为.PETrust根据自主元素信誉特征的变化动态调整惩罚力度.理论分析和实验结果表明,PETrust能够有效区分自主元素的不同行为特征,遏制和惩罚恶意行为,提高自主元素诚实交易的积极性和系统的整体效率,并具有更好的抵御共谋欺骗的能力.PETrust还同时具备计算复杂度低、报文通信量小的特点,利于部署实施. In order to construct a trustworthy computing platform for the next Internet, there needs to be normalizing and promoting of autonomic elements in order to have them collaborate actively with on another. A novel penalty-incentive mechanism, named PETrust, based on a repeated game theory, is given in this paper. This paper aims at providing a set of mechanisms, which the behavior of autonomic elements is normalized and is promoted to take the expected strategy. PETrust adjusts the degree of penalty by changing the reputation status. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that PETrust can distinguish the different features of behavior, effectively, can punish and stifle malicious behavior, can improve the system's entire efficiency, can stimulate autonomic elements' honest trade enthusiasm, and can provide a better capacity of resisting collusive deception. Furthermore, PETrust presents both low time complexity and few incurred packets, which is favourable for engineering deployment and implementation.
出处 《软件学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2010年第12期3042-3055,共14页 Journal of Software
基金 国家重点基础研究发展计划(973)Nos.2005CB321800 2005CB321804~~
关键词 自主元素 信誉 协作 行为规范 惩罚激励 autonomic element reputation collaboration behavior criterion penalty and incentive
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