摘要
本文从第二类代理问题和引入外部监管的角度,基于终极控制权刻画控股股东控制权和大股东制衡机制,揭示属于不同利益阵营的公司大股东治理战略对独立董事制度的作用。实证研究显示:控股股东控制权比例与独立董事规模之间表现为正"U"形关系;控股股东现金流权比例(卷入程度)越高,董事会中独立董事数量越少,独立董事比例越低;其他大股东制衡度越高,董事会中独立董事数量越多,独立董事比例越高。
From the perspective of type II agency problem and external supervision, the paper, based on ultimate control right, depict control rights of controlling shareholders and counterbalance mechanism of blockholders to explore impacts of governance strategy of blockholders from different interest camp on scale of independent directors. Empirical research indicates that： there is an U-shape between control rights of controlling shareholders and scale of independent directors; cash flow rights （involvement） of controlling shareholders are negatively associated with amount and ratio of independent directors; balance degree of other blockholders are positively associated with amount and ratio of independent directors.
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期93-99,共7页
Auditing Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"大股东治理战略研究:基于大股东制衡与外部监管的实证与实验"(项目批准号:70802015)资助
关键词
终极控制权
治理战略
大股东制衡
第二类代理问题
ultimate control right, governance strategy, blockholders counterbalance, type II agency problem
