摘要
逮捕是一种并非由司法机关单方意志决定的策略行为。是否适用逮捕取决于司法机关与犯罪嫌疑人双方的博弈。目前逮捕率过高在于逮捕是博弈中犯罪嫌疑人占优条件下的次优选择。监视居住和人保方式的取保候审并非理性的选择。财保取保候审中最小保证金数额是司法机关发现查获嫌疑人妨害诉讼的概率和犯罪嫌疑人妨害诉讼最大可能收益的一个函数。降低逮捕率是可能的。
Arrestment is not a strategy merely decided by judicatory organ, but a Nash equilibrium which involves the judicatory organ and suspect. High rate of arrest is caused by the fact that to arrest the suspect is the next best option given that the suspect is in an advantageous position in the equilibrium. Residential sur- veillance and guarantor assure in the release upon bail pending trial are irrational choices. The minimum a- mount of the bail determines the probalility that the judicatory organ may find suspect＇ s hampering litigation, and it is also a function of suspect＇ s maximum profit through hampering litigation. Therefore it is possible to lower the arrest rate.
出处
《西南政法大学学报》
2010年第5期121-128,共8页
Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law
关键词
逮捕
博弈
占优策略
纳什均衡
arrestment
game
dominant strategy
Nash equilibrium
