摘要
本文旨在揭示国有银行呆账的特殊内涵及其理论意义。作者首先通过一个简单的厂商均衡模型，在呆账与渐进转轨之间建立起某种逻辑联系，结果表明，国有银行的大部分呆账导因于为支持渐进转轨而进行的信贷剩余转移。随后，在一个国有银行的信贷均衡模型中，对国有银行信贷行为所遵循的“长边规则”（借方规则）及其后果作了初步解释。最后，基于双重呆账模型，揭示了国有银行呆账的两种形式（政策性呆账和商业性呆账）及其相互关系。
The article focuses attention on the properties of the bad debts in state banks and on their theoretical meanings. It begins with a simple firm equilibrium model Which relates logically the bad debts with the gradual transition, indicating that the former, to a lamp degree, have resulted from the credit surplus transfer for the support of the latter. Then, by establishing a state banks' credit equilibrium model, the article gives a tentative explanation of the rules of borrowers followed by state banks in making credit, meanwhile, the consequences are also explored. in the end, based on the dual-bad--debt model, the article points out the fact of the actual existence of ho types of bad debts in state banks-commercial ones and those resulting from policy-and illustrates their relationships as well.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
1999年第5期35-40,共6页
Journal of Financial Research
