摘要
针对一个生产商和两个零售商组成的供应链,利用Hotelling模型分析了两个零售商间的选址与定价博弈,得到了价格竞争均衡的存在性条件.给出了集中式控制下供应链的最优选址和定价决策,并研究了生产商如何设计合理的批发价合同和选址约束来协调零售商选取供应链最优选址和定价.当两个零售商的单位销售成本相同时,统一的批发价和选址约束能实现供应链协调.当单位销售成本不同,提出了协调供应链的分段批发价合同.最后,分析了社会净福利最大化下的最优决策,发现当两个零售商的单位销售成本不同时,供应链最优决策与之并不一致.
For a two-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers,this paper analyzes the game that two retailers simultaneously choose their locations,and then compete in price by using Hotelling model.The existence conditions of retailers＇ equilibrium prices are obtained.The optimal locating and pricing decisions of centralized supply chain are put forward.This paper further studies how the manufacturer designs the reasonable wholesale price contracts and location restrictions to coordinate the retailers choosing the supply chain optimal decisions.It shows that the supply chain can be coordinated by a constant wholesale price and an identical location restriction when the unit sale costs of two retailers are uniform.A disjunct wholesale price contract is put forward to coordinate supply chain when two retailers have different unit sale costs.Finally,the decisions of maximizing the social net welfare are obtained,which are inconsistent with the optimal decisions of supply chain when two retailers have different unit sale costs.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第5期609-615,共7页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(NSFC70961006)
南昌大学中国中部经济发展研究中心重点资助项目(8zbzx002)
