摘要
研究了政府投资项目代建制下寻租行为产生的内在机理,在此基础上构建了由政府业主、代建企业、审计部门三方组成的完全信息静态博弈模型。最后文章通过对模型均衡解的分析,提出了遏制寻租行为的对策。
In this paper,the Government Investment Projects under the rent-seeking behavior of the internal mechanism,constructed in this basis,the owners by the Government,on behalf of the construction business,audit tripartite complete information static game model.Finally,the paper by the analysis of equilibrium solution of the model proposed measures to curb rent-seeking behavior.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第18期165-168,共4页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金(70772075)
关键词
代建制
审计
博弈
agent system
audit
game
