摘要
在金字塔结构下,股东与经营者之间以及控股股东与中小股东之间的两类治理关系普遍存在,对于上市公司治理问题的研究也从单一治理关系分析框架向两者权衡分析转变。在双重治理关系视阈下,股权激励成为利益主体之间博弈的重要工具。本文在提出双重治理关系分析框架的基础上,运用2006～2009年我国上市公司面板数据对股权激励的双重效应及其与控股股东之间的关系进行实证检验。研究发现,股权激励对于第一类代理问题具有显著的治理效应,但对第二类代理问题的治理效应并未显现,这与控股股东对其存在显著的抑制作用有关,股权性质能够对股权激励与控股股东不同效应的体现以及两者关系产生影响。
Under the pyramidal structure, the relationship between shareholder and manager and the relationship between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder both exist. So the researches on listed companies also vary from single governance relationship structure to trade-off analysis. From perspective of dual governance relationship, Equity Incentive is an important tool for the game of stakeholders. We adopt the Panel Data of Listed Companies＇ in China to do the empirical research. The results show that equity incentive has positive effects on the first agency problem but not obvious on the second one; it is related with the conflicts between incentive and separation of two rights; and ownership property can influence the different effects of equity incentive and controlling shareholders and the relationshios between them.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第9期59-65,共7页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
股权激励
金字塔结构
控股股东
双重治理关系
equity incentives
pyramidal structure
controlling shareholder
dual governance relationship
