摘要
本文主要从信用贷款视角研究我国国有公司是否以及缘何具有信贷优惠。以2003-2005年我国A股上市公司为检验样本进行研究,发现:(1)国有公司的信用贷款比例显著高于民营公司,二者的差异平均大约为9%;(2)当公司高管具有政府部门任职经历时,二者的差异更小;(3)当公司的显性担保价值增大时,二者的差异并未减小。总的来说,本文结果支持我国国有公司的信贷优惠主要源于政府对银行信贷决策的干预,而与隐性担保假说不一致。
Existing literatures show that SOEs in China have credit advantage,and consider that there are mainly two reasons:Firstly,government intervenes in banks' credit decisions; secondly,banks anticipate that government will bail out SOEs in distress.Sampling listed companies with A-share from 2003 to 2005,the paper examine whether and why SOEs have more unsecured loans.We find that:(1) SOEs have more unsecured loans than private firms,and the average difference is about 9%; (2) the difference is smaller when the chair or CEO was a officer; and (3) the difference does not become smaller when corporate collateral value is larger Overall,our results suggest that SOEs' advantage in obtaining unsecured loans mainly results from credit intervention,and we do not provide supporting evidences on implicit collateral theory.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第8期49-54,共6页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"政府干预
银行治理与上市公司投资行为分析:基于预算软约束视角(70802065)"
教育部人文社科项目"金融发展对债务融资治理效应的影响研究(08JC630086)"
"中财121人才工程"青年博士发展基金(QBG0707)
中央财经大学"211工程"三期的资助
