摘要
针对中国企业对企业电子商务(B2B)市场的匿名性和自适应性,采用一个简单的学习过程模型来分析B2B的交易模式.该方法将博弈双方视为拥有分散知识的异质性个体,群体样本的不同导致买方和卖方适应性学习能力的差异,而学习能力的差异则会产生2个纳什均衡,即最优均衡状态和次优均衡状态.就中国的B2B而言,传统"关系"在一定条件下能使次优均衡转移到最优状态,因此建议大力发展电子商务,吸引消费者在线购物,并在商品的供应链中强化第三方的作用,而不仅仅是作为买卖双方的交易平台.
According to the anonymity and adaptivity characteristic of B2B markets,the authors analyzed offline payment modes used for B2B transactions,using a simplified model of the learning process.The approach regards participants as players in a game.They are a heterogeneous mix with different levels of knowledge.Differing sample sizes cause buyers and sellers to have different opportunities for learning.In this situation,it is possible to produce two Nash equilibriums.One is the optimal state,and the other is the second best state.As far as B2B is concerned,traditional ＂GuanXi＂ can allow the second best equilibrium to transfer towards the optimal state under some conditions.On this basis it was suggested that development of consumer purchases online would lead to B2B strengthening the role of third parties in the supply chain instead of just providing a transaction platform for enterprises.
出处
《哈尔滨工程大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第6期791-796,共6页
Journal of Harbin Engineering University
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(7067301470972096)
黑龙江省科技攻关重点资助项目(GB05D101-3)
中央高校基本科研业务专项基金资助项目(HEUCF100923)
