摘要
民营企业的政治关系作为一种有效的外部履约机制的替代,能够在一定程度上改善银企关系,缓解民营企业的融资约束。本文以2005～2009年的民营上市公司为样本,从民营上市公司的"出身"及在企业面临金融危机的条件入手,分析了民营上市公司的政治关系对融资的影响。研究发现,政治关系对民营上市公司的融资影响更多是体现在直接上市的民营公司上,有政治关系的直接上市的民营公司不仅能获得更多的融资,而且降低了银行对其融资的盈利要求。发生金融危机后,银行对企业融资的资产抵押要求更高,有政治关系的直接上市的民营公司更容易取得银行的支持,获得银行借款。本文的研究有助于理解企业政治关系对企业行为的影响。
Private enterprises＇ political connection can be an effective alternative to external compliance mechanism to a certain extent, and it can improve the relationship between banks and enterprises and ease the financing constraints of private enterprises. In this paper, using the 2005 - 2009 private listed companies as sample, we analyze how the political connection impact works on the debt financing of the direct and indirect market-listed private companies, and during financial crisis, how the political connection impact works on their debt financing. We find that, political connection impact on the financing of private listed companies is only reflected in the direct marketlisted private companies. Political connection can not only help the direct market-listed private companies get more funding, but also reduce the profitability requirements of banks when the companies financing. After the financial crisis, banks demand more asset mortgage when corporations need financing. The direct market-listed private companies with political connection can easier obtain bank support. This study can help to understand the impact of political connection on corporate behavior.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期112-119,共8页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目"产权
政治关系与资源配置"(70902024)
中国博士后科学基金"制度环境
政治关系与资源配置"(20080440118)
中国博士后科学资金特别资助"产权
政治关系与企业绩效"(200902340)
关键词
出身
政治关系
民营企业
债务融资
origin
political connection
private enterprises
debt financing
