摘要
为了深入探讨建筑工程安全监理薄弱的问题,文章运用寻租理论对工程安全监理寻租行为进行成本-收益分析,给出寻租行为产生的条件。运用博弈理论建立了业主与政府建设工程安全监督机构作为一方,监理工程师、承包商作为另外两方的工程安全监理寻租三方博弈模型,并对监理工程师和承包商之间的寻租行为进行博弈分析,提出了治理工程安全监理寻租活动的政策建议。
Focusing the problems of poor construction safety supervision, this paper analyzed the cost and benefit on the rent-seeking behavior of engineering safety supervision using rent-seeking theory. The conditions of the rent-seeking behavior were proposed. The third party game model of engineering safety supervision rent-seeking was established according to the game theory in which the owner and the governmental construction safety management agency represent one party, while the supervision engineer and the contractor represent the other two parties. The game analysis of rent-seeking behavior was carried out between the supervision engineer and the contractor. Some suggestions were put forward to control the rent-seeking behavior of engineering safety supervision.
出处
《工程管理学报》
2010年第3期281-286,共6页
Journal of Engineering Management
关键词
寻租理论
安全监理
成本-收益分析
博弈理论
三方博弈分析
纳什均衡
rent-seeking theory, safety supervision
cost and benefit analysis
game theory
third party game analysis
Nash equilibrium
