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股权控制、投资规模与利益获取 被引量:21

Ownership control,investment level and control benefit grabbing
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摘要 基于资本投资形成控制权收益的理论阐释,实证考察了不同国有股权控制特征下资本投资对控制权收益的影响.1)整体而言,投资规模与控制权收益正相关.2)资本投资对控制权收益的影响在不同股权控制分类下呈现显著差异,但对大股东持股比例不敏感;3)地方企业集团所控上市公司,其控制权收益对固定资产和股权投资规模的敏感性最高,分别为央企上市公司的10倍和6倍,为地方国资委上市公司的3.3倍和1.9倍;4)地方企业集团上市公司的资本投资在形成高控制权收益的同时,侵害了公司价值.上述研究为进一步完善股权分置改革后的上市模式选择,加快市场化进程以促进资本投资的私有利益外部化等方面提供了理论和经验依据. Based on the theory of the capital investment results in control benefit , this paper empirically studies the impact of capital investment on control benefit grabbing under different control characters of national shareholders. The conclusion is : 1 ) As a whole, the capital investment level is positive relativity with the control benefit. 2)The relationship between investment level and control benefit is significant under different control characters; but not significantly sensitive to ownership ratio. 3 ) The companies controlled by the local group grab most of the control benefits from capital investment, and the control benefit is 10 times and 6 times more than what the central governments grab, 3.3 times and 1.9 times more than what the local governments grab respectively in fixed assets and equity investment. 4) While the capital investment of local groups grabs the maximum control benefit, the enterprise value is damaged. These conclusions and findings provide evidence for improving the mechanism of listing after non-tradable shares reform, and propelling the transparency of the private benefit through marketization.
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第7期68-87,共20页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902030 70772100 70771118) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(09JC730006) 重庆大学自主科研面上项目
关键词 投资规模 股权控制 控制权收益 公司价值 investment level ownership control control benefit enterprise value
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