摘要
科学的监督和有效的管理是实现环境可持续发展的必由之路，政府与排污企业的博弈是一个值得关注的重要问题。基于声誉理论，论文建立了政府与排污企业问的静态与动态激励监控模型，结论认为在动态激励监督下政府的总效用实现了帕累托改善，研究表明考虑以往业绩的两阶段最优契约对排污企业具有明显的声誉激励效应，同时表明监控机制和激励契约具有互补性，最后对机制设计中的控制参数的灵敏度以及模型的鲁棒性进行了探讨，可为政府制定合理的激励监督措施提供理论参考依据。
Scientific monitor and effective management is the only way to realize the natural environment sustainable development, thus the game between the Government and the Pollutant Discharging Enterprises become to an important issue of concern today. Based on the reputation theory, a static and dynamic monitoring model between the Government and the pollutant discharging Enterprises was constructed. The results show that the total utility of the Government realized Pareto improvement, and there will have an explicit incentive effect of reputation considering the previous performance of the two - period contract Monitoring mechanisms and incentive mechanisms can be complementary each other through the study of the monitoring mechanisms and incentive mechanisms. And then the sensitivity of these control parameters about the optimal contract and model robustness were discussed.
出处
《环境科学与管理》
CAS
2010年第6期1-6,共6页
Environmental Science and Management
基金
基金项目：国家自然科学基金及上海市自然科学基金联合资助项目（70273029）
关键词
声誉效应
激励契约
动态模型
监控
reputation effects
incentives schemes
dynamic game
monitoring
