摘要
本文选取了2002—2006年沪深交易所上市公司会计业绩指标、盈余管理指标与公司高管层年度薪酬数据,对股改前后中国上市公司会计业绩与经理薪酬之间的敏感度变化进行检验,并考察上市公司经理薪酬与盈余管理变量相关关系在股改前后的变化。结果发现,股改后经理行为对会计业绩敏感性增强,公司长期发展的会计业绩变量回归系数及显著性水平显著提高,公司治理机制得到改善。在对股改前后的分组数据进行整体回归后发现,非操纵性应计利润与操纵性应计利润对经理薪酬都存在显著正相关关系,并且股改后的显著性水平较股改前有所提高。净资产指标在经理薪酬契约中的显著性水平在股改后有所下降,公司所有者正在经历由账面价值最大化向市场价值最大化转变的过程。
With the promotion of Stock Split Reform in China＇s capital market, stakeholders＇ benefit orientation and behaviors are generally affected. Compensation contract will be revised, and the pay-performance sensitivity and the correlation between executive pay and earnings management will be changed, which directly affect executives＇ accounting practice. This paper examines these changes using CEO compensation data, performance indicators and corporate-government data of listed companies over 2002--2006. Empirical study results show that the positive correlation between accounting performance variables and CEO compensation is more significant after the Stock Split Reform, which suggests that executives are more sensitive to the market-based compensation contract and are making more effort to enhance accounting performance after the reform. The results of model 1 also suggest that regression coefficients on long-term accounting performance indicators are more significant than short-term ones after the reform. The pay-performance sensitivity and the corporate governance mechanism have been improved during the process of Stock Split Reform. Our findings also suggest that there is a higher significance level of regression coefficient of non-discretionary accruals over CEO compensation after the reform, which proves that the Stock Split Reform enhance the effectiveness of China＇s capital market and executives pay more attention to real corporate performance. The change of panel data regression result on discretionary accruals is not obvious, and after we set samples into two groups divided by the time spot of Stock Split Reform, it shows that the significance level of regression coefficient is higher after the reform than before it. This result proves that after the reform, executives still have the motivation to manage earnings so that they can reach the target set in the compensation contract and realize the purpose of maximizing self-interest. The earnings management methods diversify and become diffic
出处
《中国会计评论》
CSSCI
2010年第1期17-30,共14页
China Accounting Review
关键词
股权分置改革
经理薪酬
会计业绩
盈余管理
Stock Split Reform, CEO Compensation, Accounting Performance, Earnings Management
