摘要
当审计结果不利于上市公司管理层时，管理层通常具有强烈的规避动机。本文以2000，2002年间被出具非无保留意见审计报告的上市公司为样本，观察了这些公司在随后一个会计年度中不利审计结果的改善（指不利审计意见和审计后净利润同时改善）与异常审计费用变动的关联关系，结果发现：在不发生审计师变更的环境下，控制了公司基本财务特征及其变动情况后，异常审计收费的提高与不利审计结果的改善显著正相关；但在发生了审计师变更的环境下，异常审计收费的提高并不显著伴随着不利审计结果的改善。该证据意味着审计独立性很可能受到公司管理层所提供经济利益的负面影响，即使是具有高风险的公司，其管理层在很大程度上也拥有掌控审计结果的能力。
When an audit opinion for the period t is unfavourable to the management of a listed company, the management often have a strong motivation to avoid it in the following period （t ＋ 1）. This paper examines the association between the change in abnormal audit fees （AAF） and the improvement of unfavourable audit outcomes （UAO） from the period t to t ＋ 1, using a sample of Chinese listed companies with modified audit opinions during 2000-2002. We find that after controlling for the company＇s fundamental financial characteristics and their change from period t to t ＋ 1, an increase in AAF without changing the auditor is significantly and positively associated with the improvement of UAO, while an increase in AAF concur- rent with a change in the auditor is not significantly associated with improved UAO. The result suggests that economic interests provided by the management probably compromise auditor independence. Even for those companies with high risks, the management have the canaeitv to influence the audit outcomes to a great extent.
出处
《中国会计与财务研究》
2005年第4期1-54,共54页
China Accounting and Finance Review
关键词
不利审计结果
异常审计收费
审计独立性
Unfavourable Audit Opinions, Abnormal Audit Fees, Auditor Independence
