摘要
在信息不对称的状态下，公司经理把股利政策作为一种信号，向投资者传递企业持久盈利的信息。持久盈利是现在和未来可分配盈利的近似现值，企业是根据持久盈利而不是当期盈利来决定股利的支付路径。股利的变化意味着持久盈利的变化，股利有信息含量。本文的目的就是试图用中国证券市场的经验证据来验证这个假设。本文选取了1992年至1997年389个中国上市公司作为样本，以股利变化当年为0年，研究发现股利增加的公司其盈利在0年、1年和2年均有较为显著的增长。股利减少的公司在1年、2年盈利有显著的减少，并且股利的类型不同，其传递的信息也有一定的差异。从总体上来看，中国的经验证据在一定程度上支持股利有信息含量这个假设。
Managers usually consider dividend policy as a signal communicating information about permanent earnings of businesses to investors under the state of information asymmetry. Permanent earnings are the approximate present value of current and future distributable incomes. Companies determine the payment path of dividends on the basis of their permanent earnings, rather than their current earnings. Changes in dividends imply changes in permanent earnings. In other words, changes in dividends have information content. The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis of the information content of dividends using empirical evidence from China＇s securities market. This study selects a sample of 389 of China＇s listed companies from 1992 to 1997. It has been found that, taking the year of dividend change as year 0, companies which increase their dividends in year 0 experience significant earnings increase in years 0, 1, and 2, while companies which reduce their dividends in year 0 experience a significant reduction in earnings in years 1 and 2. Moreover, there are certain differences regarding the information communicated by various kinds of dividend. In general, the Chinese empirical evidence supports the hypothesis up to a point.
出处
《中国会计与财务研究》
1999年第2期120-163,共44页
China Accounting and Finance Review
关键词
股利
持久盈利
股利支付路径
dividends, information content, permanent earnings
