摘要
高薪未必养廉。从多任务委托代理模型来看,除了政府官员的工作业绩外,政府官员的风险态度、工作努力成本变化率和工作的监督性等因素都对高薪养廉之策有影响。当政府官员代理多项任务时,如果任务之间在成本上存在互补性,把多项任务捆绑起来委托给代理人比单项独立委托给代理人的激励效应大。如果在成本上存在替代性,增加某一任务的激励,将抬高在成本上被这种任务替代的任务的激励门槛。如果任务之间相互独立,实行竞争上岗、自由择岗,高薪养廉意义更大。同时,构建社会诚信体系有助于高薪养廉。
Giving high salaries to uncorrupted government officials may not effectively prevent them from corruption. From the angle of multi - task principal - agent model, besides the performance of the government officials, their attitude towards risks, change ratio of hard - working costs, and the supervision of their jobs all have influence on the policy. When several tasks with complementarily in costs are assigned to government officials, the incentive effect is stronger to assign multi -tasks to a single agent instead of giving them to separate agents. If the tasks substitute each other in costs, the incentive level of the tasks may be increased by giving more incentive to any one of the tasks. If the tasks are independent, it is much more meaningful to taking measures such as competitive employment, free choice of positions, and giving high salaries to uncorrupted government officials. Meanwhile, constructing a social honest and trust system is helpful to give high salaries to uncorrupted officials.
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期126-132,共7页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金
2007年教育部人文社科规划基金项目"清代火耗归公与养廉银制度"(07JA790061)
关键词
高薪养廉
腐败
多任务委托代理
Giving High Salaries to Uncorrupted Government Officials
Corruption
Multi -task Principal - agent
