摘要
文章认为产业集群内部同类企业较多、企业间交流比较频繁,同时也提供了一个有效的经理人市场,这些条件使得经理人的声誉传播更有效、岗位竞争更激烈、业绩的相互比较更容易,从而使得对经理人的隐性激励机制更有效。对此,文章采用博弈论的方法对上述观点进行了证明。
There are many similar enterprises within an industrial cluster,where information exchange occurs frequently and gives rise to an effective manager market.Such a situation leads to more effective extension of the manager＇s reputation,more intense competition for a position and easier comparison of managers’performance.As a result,the mechanism of implicit incentive for managers becomes more effective.In this regard,the paper adopts game theory to prove the above-mentioned points.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期63-68,共6页
Management Review
基金
辽宁省社会科学规划项目(L07BJY029)
辽宁省社会科学界联合会研究项目(2009lslktglx-80)
关键词
产业集群
经理人
激励
博弈
industrial cluster
manager
incentive
game theory
