摘要
农村非正规金融高履约率的背后是相当不完备的借贷契约,文章从基于村庄信任的社会资本机制、基于博弈论的声誉机制和基于非法律的惩罚机制三个方面分析了农村非正规金融履约机制的运行机理,解释了不完备契约如何对农村非正规金融产生动态的约束、激励和惩罚,从而保证了借贷合约的履行。
The reason for higher fulfillment rate of rural informal finance is quite incomplete contract. The paper explains how incomplete contract generate dynamic constrains, incentives and penalties for rural informal finance to ensure the fulfillment of loan contract from three respects： 1） social capital mechanism based on a village trust; 2） prestige mechanism based on game theory; 3） penalty mechanism based on non-legal.
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2010年第6期56-59,63,共5页
Ecological Economy
基金
新疆维吾尔自治区高校科研计划科学研究重点项目(XJEDU2008155)
关键词
不完全契约
农村非正规金融
履约机制
incomplete contract, rural informal finance, fulfillment mechanism
