摘要
通过构造一个医疗服务系统的均衡模型,分析了医院等级、居民道德风险与最优公共医疗保险合同之间的关系。研究表明只存在公共医疗保险体系时,如果政府部门之间缺乏协调机制,各自为政,中国的公共医疗保险支付方式将不能实现社会最优并消除道德风险;公共医疗保险合同可能引起社会福利的损失或引致道德风险。政府应该完善医院评价系统,对不同医院的水平给予准确的评级,特别是要建立起政府各部门之间的协调机制;理顺医疗服务价格体系;鼓励更多市场参与主体进入医疗保险领域,建立合理的疾病风险分担机制。
This paper analyzes the relations among rank of hospital, household＇s moral hazard and optimal public health insurance contracts by forming a general equilibrium model of medical service system. The result shows that when there is only public health insurance system, and if coordinate mechanisms between government departments are deficient, China＇s public health insurance payment way will not achieve the social optimum and eliminate moral hazard, and public medical insurance contracts may cause loss of social welfare or give rise to moral hazard. In this condition, our government should perfect the evaluation system of hospitals , especially establish coordinate mechanisms among the various government departments, optimize the price system for health services, encourage more market subjects entering into health insurance field and establish reasonable risk-sharing mechanisms of disease.
出处
《广东金融学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期96-106,共11页
Journal of Guangdong University of Finance
基金
国家自然科学基金(70773123)
教育部人文社会科学基金(07JA840008
09YJ840007)
对外经济贸易大学"211工程"重点学科建设项目(73000010)
关键词
医院等级
道德风险
最优公共医疗保险合同
rank of hospital
moral hazard
optimal public health insurance contracts
