摘要
多方参与城市基础设施供给的融资模式是解决我国城市基础设施巨额资金需求的有效途径,但项目公司为了自身利益违反合同约定使政府无法实现其城市基础设施建设公益性目标的情况经常出现。为此,政府通过中介机构对项目公司进行监控,并根据中介机构上报的监控报告对守约的项目公司给予奖励,对违约的项目公司给予处罚。论文应用元胞自动机理论对政府根据中介机构监控报告可能采取的激励措施进行了仿真,得到了各种激励模式下的演化特征,为政府制定相关政策,优化激励规则提供了依据。
Financing mode provided by multi-participants for urban infrastructure is an effective way to fulfill the huge financial need of urban infrastructure construction. But for the sake of self-interests, some project companies violate the contracts so that the government cannot achieve the commonwealth purpose for government infrastructure construction. Therefore, the government monitors the project companies through intermediary agencies. According to the monitor report by intermediary agencies, the government awards the companies which follow the contracts and punishes the companies which violate the contracts. This paper employs the cellular automaton theory to simulate the possible incentive measures taken by the government based on the report provided by intermediary agencies. Evolvement characteristics under all kinds of incentive models are obtained which provide the basis for the government to make policies and optimize the incentive rules.
出处
《工程管理学报》
2010年第1期18-22,共5页
Journal of Engineering Management
基金
黑龙江省科学技术项目(GC07D405)
关键词
城市基础设施
融资
元胞自动机
激励
仿真
urban infrastructure
financing
cellular automaton
incentive
simulation
