摘要
在现实生活中,地方政府自身利益是客观存在的。地方政府通过追求任期内政绩工程来实现官员的个人利益,通过机构扩张和预算最大化来实现机构利益,通过获取辖区财政资源来实现辖区共容利益。这种利益的实现是地方政府基于外在监督和内在收益而做出的现实选择。在外在监督缺失的情况下,地方政府对自身利益的追求导致政府行为的异化和扭曲,需要采取有效措施予以治理。
In real life,the local government self-interest are objective existence.Local governments achieve the official personal interests through pursuit of political projects.They achieve the agency interests through expansion of agencies and maximizing the budget and they achieve the encompassing interests of local government through access to financial resources.The interests are realistic choice that local government to make based on external oversight and internal revenue.Being out of external oversight,local government inter ests make government behavior alienation and distortion,so it is necessary to take measures guiding and guarding against the local gov ernment self-interest.
出处
《上海行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期22-28,共7页
The Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目"转型期劳资冲突化解的地方治理机制研究"的阶段性成果(项目批准号:09YJC630220)
关键词
地方政府
自身利益
政府行为
Local Government
Self-interest
Government Behavior
