摘要
对于企业过度投资问题的研究,目前国内文献一般集中于代理问题展开的。本文认为,产品市场竞争也会对公司的过度投资行为产生影响。通过2001～2004年中国制造业上市公司数据,本文实证研究发现,产品市场竞争对公司的过度投资行为有显著影响,市场竞争能够约束公司过度投资水平。当公司代理问题严重时,产品市场竞争状况与公司的过度投资水平高度相关,公司经理会利用现金流进行过度投资。另外,处于行业内主要厂商地位的公司的过度投资问题也比其它公司严重。
Researches on corporate over-investment,which is mainly donewith the thoughts of agencyproblem.Managers would trigger over-investment,which is due to opportunism behavior,although some literatures correlate the institution background with the investment problem.This paper argues that product market competition also affect the corporate over-investment behavior.By 2001～2004's data of Chinese listed companies which are manufacturers,this paper empirically find that product market competition do effect on corporate over-investment.The competition could constraint the over-investment level for listed companies.The results show that managers would use cash flow for bad project,in which companies with severe agency problem.Meanwhile,corporations which are dominant producers in the industries may over-invest more than the others.
出处
《金融评论》
2010年第1期75-84,共10页
Chinese Review of Financial Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金"公司治理视角下的上市公司经营困境评价模型及实证研究"(批准号:70872033
起止时间:2009~2012)子项目的研究成果
关键词
产品市场
竞争
上市公司
过度投资
Product Market
Competition
Listed Corporation
Over-investment
