摘要
传统知识论主张确证是知识的必要条件之一。对于确证回溯困境应如何解决以及确证回溯是否会引发怀疑论,基础主义、一致主义与语境主义虽然各自给出答案,但都有不合理之处。从确证的结构分析入手,可以概括出一条"确证原理"。通过比较"确证原理"与"认知闭合原则"之异同,可以知道确证回溯在什么情况下将陷入怀疑论,而在什么情况下则不会。人们对于理由是否必须是逻辑蕴涵的问题意见分歧,说明存在着两种完全不同的认识观。确证概念自身需要深入细致的分析,而这个重要的环节在以往知识论发展过程中被忽视了。因此,我们认为,"回溯困境"的实质就是确证的概念含混不清的问题。唯有明确了认识的规范性,确证问题才有可能最终解决。
Abstract： In traditional epistemology, justification is one of the necessary conditions of knowledge. But as to the problem of regression of justification and the question of whether regression of justification would result in skepticism, Foundationalism, Coherentism and Contextualism offer different but unique answers, none of which are free from defects. This paper argues that by conducting construction analyses, it is possible to generate a principle of justification and that by contrasting ＂the closure principle of knowing＂ with ＂the principle of justification＂, it is possible to know whether or not and under what circumstances skepticism will occur. There have been two completely different epistemological views on the question ＂Is knowledge closed under known entailment？＂ The concept of justification should be analyzed carefully before it is used, but this important issue has been ignored in traditional epistemology. It is argued that the problem of regression of justification is actually a problem of misunderstanding the concept of justification and that this problem can be solved only after the normative nature of knowledge is clarified.
出处
《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期94-101,115,共9页
Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
关键词
知识定义
确证回溯
怀疑论
definition of knowledge, the problem of regression of justification, skepticism
