摘要
创业企业对创业企业家的激励是否有效决定着创新的成败。为了研究创业投资中的利益分割问题,从创业过程的特征出发,本文首先分析创业企业家的角色特征,应用间接定价理论和交易效率比较,结合委托-代理模型,构造了基于对创业企业家间接定价的创业企业利益分割的两部动态规划模型,并进一步探讨了债权型和股权型利益分割合约的使用条件和创业企业管理团队的选择问题。研究表明:创业企业家和创业资本家的利益分割合约是基于两部动态规划的优化问题;债权型与股权型合约作为利益分割机制对于创业企业家和资本家的效用取决于各自对未来的预期;只有满足一定条件下,创业企业才倾向于选择能力较高的第三方团队充当企业管理者;在能力同等条件下,创业企业倾向于选择创业企业家充当创业企业的管理者。
Whether the motivation to venture enterprise is effective or not decides the success or failure of innovation. To study interest division in venture investment, this thesis analyzes the entrepreneur＇s role features based on the characters of his venture process, and by an application of the indirect pricing theory and a comparison of transaction efficiency, combined with the principal-agent model, it builds a bipartite dynamic planning model for the venture enterprise＇s interest division subject to indirect pricing of the entrepreneur. Then this thesis discusses respectively the application conditions of two types of interest division agreement, i. e. creditor type and stock equity type, and probe the selection of management by the venture enterprise. This study shows an interest division agreement between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist is a matter of optimization based on bipartite dynamic programming, and only when certain conditions are satisfied will the enterprise be inclined to choose a third party who has greater competence as its management; if under the same competence, the enterprise tends to choose an entrepreneur as its management.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期85-90,73,共7页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672089
70571034
70731002)
教育部博士点基金资助项目(20050700009)
中国博士后基金资助项目(20080431083)
江苏省博士后基金资助项目
关键词
利益分割
间接定价
剩余索取权
人力资本
委托-代理
interest division
indirect pricing
residual fights
human capital
principal-agent
