摘要
本文利用2005～2008年我国15家商业银行年报的混合数据,就我国商业银行管理者薪酬与银行业绩的关系进行实证研究。研究结果表明,管理者薪酬与商业银行业绩之间呈现显著的倒U型关系。本文还发现,当前我国商业银行管理者薪酬较高,即存在所谓的"激励过度"。本文认为,我国商业银行应适当降低管理者薪酬以充分发挥正向激励作用,而规范管理者薪酬的关键在于制度,特别是监督机制的完善。
Scientific and efficient compensation is the cornerstone for commercial banks to improve governance and promote development. This article uses 2005-2008 mixed data of fifteen commercial banks to study the relationship between management compensation and bank＇s performance. The empirical result reveals the relationship as a significantly inverted U-shape. The article also finds that management compensation is overdosed. So, it suggests that commercial banks correct the excessive incentive by constructing regulatory system, especially supervision mechanism.
出处
《上海金融》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第11期29-32,共4页
Shanghai Finance
关键词
管理者薪酬
银行业绩
激励
Management Compensation
Bank s Performance
Incentive
