摘要
本文基于RKRV(2005)估值模型,利用我国上市公司1999-2006年的数据,对价值被高估的上市公司是否进行盈余操纵进行了实证检验,结果表明上市公司未来一期的操纵性应计与价值被高估的程度显著正相关,控制公司规模、财务杠杆、经营业绩,上市年龄等因素后相关性仍然显著。说明Jensen(2005)提出的估值过高的代理成本在我国也同样存在,因此要保护投资者的利益,提高资本市场定价的效率具有重要的意义。
Based on the data of China＇s listed companies during the period from 1999 to 2006, this paper makes an investigation of whether equity overvaluation leads to more income-increasing earnings management. Using discretional accruals as proxy variable of earning management and a measure of overvaluation based on RKRV＇s （2005）, we find that overvaluation is statistically and economically related to subsequent income-increasing earnings management and it remains significantly related after such factors as lagged firm size, lagged financial leverage, corporate performance and listed age are controlled for the effects. The results show Jensen＇s （2005） agency conflict of overvalued equity exists in China＇s listed companies. So it is important to improve the efficiency of China＇s securities market in order to protect investors＇ interests.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第11期23-29,共7页
Management Review
关键词
价值高估
代理成本
盈余管理
上市公司
overvalued equity, agency cost, earnings management, listed companies
