摘要
作为完全垄断和对称双寡头垄断非线性定价理论的拓展,本文分析了非对称双寡头企业实施完全非线性定价下消费者的选择以及由此形成的市场格局。当双寡头企业的价格套餐发生交叉且边际价格变动不一致时,会产生市场分割,高类型的消费者偏好边际价格下降速度更快的价格套餐,而低类型的消费者的偏好则相反。当双寡头企业都基于各自的成本实行最优非线性定价时,所有消费者都偏好低成本企业的价格套餐,成本劣势企业将退出市场。所得结论将为垄断行业引入竞争机制改革提供一些有益的启示。
Base an asymmetrical analyzing frame, this paper analyze the consumer behavior and market structure in duopoly industry under entirely nonlinear pricing. When the price project of duopoly are across and the change of marginal price are difference, the market are segmented. The high level consumers are favor of the price with highly dropping velocity, with the low level consumers in the contrary. When the duopoly carry out the best nonlinear price based on their marginal cost, all consumers are favor of the price of the firm with lower cost. The main conclusion of this paper gives some suggestion for the reform of introducing competing mechanism in monopolistic industry.
出处
《首都经济贸易大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期5-14,共10页
Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business
基金
国家哲学社会科学基金项目<博弈论应用与经济动态模拟研究>(项目编号02EJY003)
首都经济贸易大学研究生创新项目<寡头垄断企业的非线性定价行为研究>
关键词
寡头垄断
非线性定价
市场分割
非对称管制
duopoly
nonlinear pricing
market segmentation
asymmetric regulation
