摘要
本文利用现代经济学的公司治理和委托代理理论,尤其是多项任务委托代理理论、内部人控制理论和经理人市场理论,对我国国有商业银行的治理结构和管理层激励进行了经济分析,主要结论包括:第一,不应继续要求国有商业银行承担政策性任务或目标,防止国有商业银行的多目标经营;第二,国有商业银行的市场化改革要求给予管理层足够的经营决策权,而经营决策权的授予又要求建立配套的公司治理和正向激励机制,否则会出现内部人控制的问题;第三,应不断改善国有商业银行所处的市场环境,逐步建立高效和规范的银行经理人市场;第四,应探索使用优先股方式实现国有股权,这样一方面可以更好地保证国有金融资产的保值增值,避免政府对国有商业银行日常经营活动的行政干预,防止国有商业银行的多目标经营;另一方面可以通过赋予优先股股东(国有出资人)对管理层薪酬制度的表决权,确保在管理层激励机制的设计中兼顾优先股股东的利益,从而防止国有商业银行管理层的过度冒险行为。
Utilizing the modem theories of muhitask agency, insider control and managerial labor market, this paper analyzes the governance structure and managerial incentives of state - controlled commercial banks （SC- CBs） in China. The main conclusions are as follows. First, it is not economically efficient to continue to require SCCBs carry out policy functions and projects. Second, the market - oriented reforms of SCCBs result in managers having more decision - making power, which makes it necessary to establish proper corporate governance and provide positive incentives to managers, otherwise insider control could become a problem. Third, the operating environment of SCCBs should be improved, and an efficient market for bank managers should be developed. Fourth, the use of preferred stock should be explored as a potentially effective way to structure state ownership; preferred stock ranks senior to common stock, thus better protects state interest; preferred stock could also reduce unwanted government interference with SCCBs＇ daily operation, thus helping prevent SCCBs＇ multitasking; by incorporating preferred shareholders＇ interest into managers＇ incentive contracts, preferred shareholders could help reduce excessive risk taking by bank managers.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期57-67,共11页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
多项任务委托代理
管理激励
内部控制
优先股
multi - task agency, managerial incentives, insider control, preferred stock
