摘要
安全事故频繁发生是我国小煤矿的现状和特点。文章从小煤矿的内部管理、政府监管及矿工举报三个方面入手,分析了小煤矿安全监管体系中由于行为原因而引起的问题,从而建立了小煤矿安全监管体系中基于监管部门、小煤矿及矿工三方之间的两两博弈模型。并根据博弈模型的纳什均衡解得出能使三方达到均衡并可加强安全监管的几点政策建议。
Frequent safety accidents happen in small coal mines in china and are characteristics of them. Starting from the three aspects of interior management, supervision and reporting, the paper analyzes problems due to behavior reasons which exist in safety supervision system of small coal mines, and builds the models of game theory among the government, coal mine owners and workers. And it puts forward some pieces of advice for the reinforcement of safety supervision which make the three parties in Nash equilibrium based on the result for the model.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第4期73-78,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
小煤矿
安全监管
博弈分析
纳什均衡
small coal mine
safety supervision
analysis of game theory
Nash equilibeium
