摘要
国际铁矿石市场的各种契约安排呈现一条从纵向一体化向现货交易逐渐过渡、连续渐变的契约安排频谱,从频谱的左端到右端,相应价格机制的刚性逐渐增强。由于构成铁矿石市场主体利润函数的各经济变量是外部环境和契约安排的函数(本文重点关注了利润函数中交易成本这一经济变量,它包括计量、搜寻、讨价还价、风险和治理成本),因此针对既定的外部环境,市场主体力求与交易对象达成使自身利润最大化的契约安排进而与交易对象围绕契约安排进行讨价还价。当这种讨价还价达到纳什均衡状态时,均衡价格与交易数量同时被决定,铁矿石市场随即达到均衡状态。自上世纪五十年代以来国际铁矿石市场中契约安排重大变化均可被解读为外部环境变化影响了铁矿石进出口国的利润函数变量,进而均衡契约安排在频谱上的落点不断推移的过程。
All the contractual arrangements in a successive and incrementally changing spectrum, the international iron ore market can be connected into which extends from vertical integration to spot transaction, and this property makes the contractual arrangement of the market a continuous variable. From the left end to the right end, the price rigidity strengthens gradually. Since the potential profits of the players in the market are the functions of the external environment and contractual arrangements, the players would try to reach the optimal contractual arrangements which maximize their profits and bargain about the arrangements in accordance with the certain environment. As soon as the players reach Nash equilibrium of the bargaining, the arrangements and corresponding simultaneously, hence the whole international iron ore the substantial c be explained by hanges equilibrium prices and quantities are determined market reach the equilibrium condition. Most of of the contractual arrangements in international iron ore markets from 1950s can this theory.
出处
《上海经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第8期13-23,共11页
Shanghai Journal of Economics
关键词
铁矿石
契约安排
频谱
价格机制
iron ore, contractual arrangements, spectrum, price mechanism
