摘要
不确定性和信息不对称常常被认为是医疗市场失灵和政府干预的依据,但政府的过度干预会导致医疗声誉机制的扭曲。改革现行"管办不分"的医疗卫生体制,由市场声誉取代政府行政干预,通过重复博弈建立医生与患者之间的长期稳定关系,解决医疗卫生领域的难题。
Uncertainty and information asymmetry are often considered to be foundations of medical market failure and government intervention, however, the excessive government intervention will lead to distortion of medical reputation mechanism. Reform the current medical and health system which disseparation of supervisor and service supply, use market reputation to replace governmental administrative intervention, through repeated games to establish long-term and stable relations between doctors and patients, solve the problem in medical and health field.
出处
《中国药物经济学》
2009年第3期40-45,共6页
China Journal of Pharmaceutical Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目<监管
自律与医生道德风险规避>(批准号:70673114)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
市场失灵
政府干预
声誉机制
重复博弈
market failure
government intervention
reputation mechanism
repeated games
