摘要
在政府不可能以财政来支持体制内系统本身运转时,迫使内生的国家金融控制来支撑旧体制。同时体制内企业改革的复杂性反过来迫使国家迟迟无法进行全面系统的金融改革,使储蓄向投资转化机制处于低效运行状态。而地方政府"为增长而竞争"进一步扭曲了中国对外资的实际需求。基于1985—2006年的数据进一步证实了内生金融控制这个解释。
When government can not support the system through fiscal capacity, it force the endogenous financial control to support it. At the same time, the overall financial reform can not be achieved due to the complexity of the reform of enterprise in the system, which makes savings can not be transferred to investment. And local government＇s competeness for growth further tortued the real demand for FDI. Based on the data of 1985-2006, the explanation of endogenous financial control on this situation is proved.
出处
《改革与战略》
北大核心
2009年第6期63-66,共4页
Reformation & Strategy
关键词
FDI
储蓄
内生金融控制
FDI
savings
endogenous financial control
