摘要
在很多市场上,消费者在不同品牌的产品之间转换消费将面临转移成本,即使在功能相同的产品之间进行转换消费,转移成本也会存在。文章主要是在动态博弈的框架下研究转移成本存在对企业的策略性行为和社会福利的影响。在产量竞争模型中,研究表明随着转移成本的变化,在位企业可以封锁、阻止或容纳进入,当进入发生时,社会福利增加。在引入产品差异而建立的价格竞争模型中,在位企业可能阻止或容纳潜在竞争企业的进入,但不能封锁进入,不管何种情况发生,社会福利都不会恶化。从公共政策的角度看,政府应该鼓励进入。文章的研究结果部分否定了Klemperer(1988)进入导致社会福利的恶化的研究结论。
Consumers will incur transfer costs when they change their consumption habits from one brand to another. The paper analyzes the effects of transfer cost on firms＇ strategic behaviors and social welfare by using dynamic game theory. In quantity-competition dynamic model, existing firms can blockade, prevent or accommodate the entry of potential competitors with the changing transfer costs, and the social welfare will rise if the entry of potential competitors occurs. In price competition model with product differentiation, existing firms can prevent or accommodate the entry of potential competitors, but they can＇t blockade the entry of potential competitors. The social welfare will not decline, no matter which strategic behavior existing firms take. Governments should encourage new entries from the perspective of public policy. The results in this paper are very different from klemperer（1988）,in which he derived that potential competitors＇ entries would make social welfare worse off.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期77-86,共10页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学项目<信息产品的定价和策略性行为分析及政府规制>(06JA790071)
上海市社科规划项目(01FJB002)
上海市教委青年基金(01QN50)
上海财经大学"211工程"的项目成果
关键词
转移成本
进入阻止
进入容纳
社会福利
transfer cost
entry deterrence
entry accommodation
social welfare
