摘要
独立董事薪酬激励、出席董事会比例与关联交易水平负相关,并对关联交易监管发挥了显著作用;而独立董事比例、会计专业人数和兼职数量等却未表现出对关联交易的显著影响;独立董事对关联交易的监管在一定程度上是有效的。
The incentive pay and attendance of board meeting is negatively related to connected transaction level and therefore effectively supervise and manage the latter. But the proportion of independent directors, number of full-time and part-time accountants does, not exert substantial influence on connected transactions. In general, independent director is to some degree effective in supervising connected transactions.
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
北大核心
2009年第3期75-81,共7页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
关键词
独立董事
关联交易
监管
independent director
connected transaction
supervision
