摘要
通过建立一个无限次重复博弈理论模型,得到报复性反倾销有效的条件:如果反倾销税率低于临界值且厂商重视长远利益,两国之间就会达成互不征收反倾销税的合作均衡,走出"囚徒困境"。利用美国反倾销数据进行的实证检验结果表明,现实中报复性反倾销是有效的,报复能力强的国家能够有效地抑制美国的反倾销调查,这对中国应对国外的反倾销具有重要的启示意义。
A model is developed in this paper to show that it is possible for two countries to achieve a cooperative equilibrium under which both countries impose no anfidumping duty, under the condition that the duty rate is not too high. This cooperative equilibrium is better than the situation of ＂prisoner dilemma＂. This paper also concludes empirically that the condition is satisfied in U. S antidumping practice, where countries with retaliation power can hold up U. S antidumping measures effectively.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期28-33,共6页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词
反倾销
重复博弈
报复性反倾销
antidumping
repeated game
revenge antidumping
