摘要
基于多任务委托代理模型的分析框架,建立了企业员工基于冗余的技术创新活动的信息不对称条件下的委托代理模型,通过对模型的分析,得出了当企业冗余不足时、适度时和过多时等不同情况下的基于冗余的技术创新活动的最优激励合同的条件,同时,还提出了效率风险概念,从理论上解释了企业普遍存在的一种现象:做出重大贡献者往往并不能分享相应的份额。
Based on the analysis frames of the multi-task principal-agent model,this paper formulates a model of principal-agent on the condition of asymmetrical information while employers are engaged in the technological innovation based on organizational slack.Through analysis of the model,this paper obtains the best incentive contracts of the technological innovation based on low,moderate,high levels of organizational slack.In addition,this paper introduces the concept of efficiency risk,which explains theoretically one kind of phenomenon generally existing in firms that one to make the significant contribution to firms is not certain to be able to share his corresponding shares.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期41-46,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70671111)
河南省教育厅自然科学研究资助项目(2008A630041)
关键词
冗余
冗余程度
技术创新
激励
委托代理
效率风险
organizational slack
levels of organizational slack
innovation
incentive
principal-agent
efficiency risk
