摘要
本文在"中国式分权"的背景下,从"利维坦假说"出发,探索了地方政府支出规模及其主要支出项目与财政分权之间的理论关系,并通过计量模型检验得到了两个主要结论:第一,财政分权推动了地方政府规模扩大,"利维坦假说"在中国并不成立;第二,财政分权对经济建设支出规模的推动力最大,对公共服务规模的作用次之,而对政府自身消费的推动力最小;并尝试性地给出了遏制政府规模扩张的政策建议。
The paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal decentralization and local government size in the view of ＂Chinese style decentralization＂ and tests Leviathan hypothesis in a panel data model, which puts two conclusions： firstly, fiscal decentralization forces local government size to expand, and Leviathan hypothesis fails to work in China; secondly, fiscal decentralization affects the size of construction the most, public service less, and government consumption the least. The paper also puts forward policy suggestions to control government size expansion.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第2期15-22,共8页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
复旦大学"金苗"资助项目(FYH3246105)
复旦大学985创新基地基金资助重大项目
关键词
“利维坦假说”
财政分权
地方政府规模
Leviathan hypothesis
fiscal decentralization
local government size
