摘要
跳跃式报价已逐渐成为增价拍卖中非常流行的现象。总结国外文献发现,对跳跃式报价问题的研究,主要集中在动机及其对拍卖预期收益影响效应2个方面。国外研究者对跳跃式报价动机的解释主要存在2种不同的观点:信号传递和策略性或是缺乏耐性出价。对跳跃式报价的拍卖收益效应的结论基本一致,即对拍卖方具有负效应,对投标者具有正效应。
Jump bidding is a popular phenomenon in ascending auction. Its foreign literature was reviewed. It is found that the studies of jump bidding are focus on two points： incentive and impact on auction revenue. There are two different explanations of the incentive of jump bidding： signaling and strategic bidding or impatience. Researcher＇s conclusions of the influences of auction revenue are identical： auction revenue influences revenue of auctioneers negatively and does bidders positively.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
2009年第2期271-276,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002)
江苏省“青蓝工程”资助项目
