摘要
考虑到中国股市的有效性程度较低及上市公司的股权集中度较高这两个因素,从债务期限结构的角度考察了管理层持股的有效性。研究发现,管理层持股越多,公司债务的期限越短。进一步的分析发现,管理层持股与债务期限结构之间存在的这种负相关关系在高信用等级的企业中表现得更为突出。这表明管理层持股减轻了管理层与股东之间的代理成本,具有一定的治理效应。
Considering the reality that validity of China＇s stock market is low and the shares of listed companies are centralized, the paper analyzes the governance effect of managerial stock ownership from the perspective of corporate debt maturity structure. We document a robust inverse relation between managerial stock ownership and the corporate debt maturity. The result of our further study shows that the inverse relation between managerial stock ownership is significant in the companies with high credit rating. The finding indicates that managerial stock ownership alleviates the agency cost between manager and shareholder, and has some governance effect.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第5期49-54,共6页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
广东省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(2202007)
关键词
管理层持股
治理效应
债务期限结构
Managerial Stock Ownership
Governance Effect
Debt Maturity Structure
