摘要
本文以我国2000至2005年期间A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨在政府控制的特殊经济环境下,股权安排对会计盈余质量的影响,试图从会计契约角度对公司治理有效性做出新的诠析。本研究发现,控股股东对盈余质量的影响是非线性的,而第二大股东则对控股股东的壕沟防御效应起到有效的遏制作用。研究还发现,在政府行政干预力度加大和内部人利益侵害行为加剧的双重推动下,国有上市公司财务报告质量将进一步被降低。
A recent section of the literature points out that in corporations with concentrated ownership, the fundamental agency problem is not the conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between outside investors and controlling shareholders who have almost full control over managers. Consequently, the behavior of controlling shareholders is the key factor for the effectiveness of corporate governance. The existing literature contains many strategies to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance systems, with the majority of this research focused on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. However, in a principal-agent situation, accounting information plays an important role in helping to prevent controlling shareholders from extracting rent from the firm. In this paper, we explore the efficiency of corporate governance from the perspective of accounting. We argue that the relationship between the earnings quality and the holding ratio of controlling shareholders is non-linear based on the share incentive effect and the entrenchment effect. Meanwhile, central or local government actions can have negative effects on the efficiency of corporate governance in the special economic environment char- acterized by government control, such as that in China. As a result, government behavior will inevitably affect the quality of accounting information. Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2000 to 2005, this paper examines the effect of ownership structure in the Chinese stock market, and explores the efficiency of corporate governance from the angle of earnings quality. The presented empirical evidence indicates that the effect of controlling shareholders is nonlinear, which shows that the share incentive effect and the entrenchment effect coexist, and the second largest shareholders have incentives to curb such tunneling effects by increasing the size of their holding. Further empirical evidence shows that the value of accounting information provided by
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2008年第6期66-73,共8页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(70632001)资助
关键词
政府行为
股权安排
盈余质量
价值相关性
Government Behavior
Ownership Structure
Earnings Quality
Value Relevance
