摘要
在跨界投资时,大企业可凭借其在原生产网络中的权力优势影响其配套企业跟随其迁移,并促使地方政府发挥政权力量满足其对优惠政策及公共产品方面要求,使母地的生产联结模式在投资地复制或迁移,快速形成"飞地型"轮轴式产业集群。集群优势又将吸引其它异地大企业进入,集群可能逐渐演变成多核型网络结构。这其中,主要配套企业对核心大企业权力行为的应对措施可促使集群根植性增强,当地政府在权力对比中的地位也将逐渐提高。
Because of its critical resources and dominant position in power relation in production networks, trans-border investment of the big enterprise can always impel its main assembling business to follow, and can also facilitate local government to make use of political power to provide tax preference and infrastructure for it, thus a isolated core-periphery rnononuelear cluster will be shaped ; the production link model in parent cluster can also be reproduced in new cluster. Attracted by its product assembling system, other big enterprises may approach the cluster, so the mono-nuclear cluster may turn into a poly-nuclear cluster gradually. The countermeasures taken by assembling business will enhance the embeddedness of cluster, and the power of local govennncnt will also be reinforced.
出处
《闽江学院学报》
2008年第6期46-50,共5页
Journal of Minjiang University
基金
闽江学院科研启动项目(YSQD7006)
