摘要
普特南的两层博弈模式丰富了外交谈判理论,但是在结盟外交领域缺乏普遍解释力。本文提出了三层博弈模式,认为结盟国家不仅是在对内与对外两个层面展开博弈,而且还在特殊的联盟框架内与盟友展开博弈,这种博弈主要依靠高层互访、口头承诺、安全合作协定和相互援助等手段加以实现。根据性质不同,联盟博弈可分为合作性博弈与竞争性博弈两大类。因此,当国家奉行不结盟政策时,双层博弈模式较具有解释力;当国家奉行结盟政策时,三层博弈模式更具有解释力。
The Two-Level Game Theory,put forward by Robert D.Putnam,greatly enriches the theory on diplomatic negotiation.Nevertheless,Putnam's theory fails to offer convincing explanation in the context of coalition diplomacy.This paper raises a hypothesis of Three-Level Game Theory,and argues that allied states not only carry out game with domestic opposition party and antagonistic states,but also with allies.In the game with allies,decision-makers rely on the means of high-level exchanges,oral commitment,security treaties and mutual aid.In terms of the types of the alliance diplomacy game,there exist cooperative and competitive games.Hence,In the context of neutrality diplomacy,the Two-Level Game Theory seems to be more convincing,while in terms of coalition diplomacy,the Three-Level Game Theory is more convincing.
出处
《国际论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期41-46,共6页
International Forum
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“准联盟外交与中国安全战略研究”(07CGJ003)
上海外国语大学2006年校重大课题“当代外交类型研究”之子课题“准联盟外交”的阶段性成果
上海市重点学科B701资助
