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非对称需求信息及零售商竞争下的供应链协调 被引量:1

Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Demand Information When Retailers Compete
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摘要 一个制造商和两个竞争的零售商组成的供应链,分析了市场信息对渠道成员及整个渠道利润的影响.渠道成员获取市场信息能增加自身的利润,以及对其他成员和整个渠道利润的变化.通过一个制造商和两个零售商之间的非完全信息博弈,研究了各成员获取信息能改变渠道利润的重新分配.基于上述分析,给出了供应链协调机制. We explore the pricing and profit implications of demand information within a channel setting. The model a distribution channel consists of a single manufacturer selling its product through two competing retailers. The demand information among the members is asymmetric. We find that improved information about demand always results in greater absolute profits, as well as a claim on greater division of channel profits for the informed channel member.
出处 《数学的实践与认识》 CSCD 北大核心 2008年第21期1-6,共6页 Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词 供应链管理 协调 非对称信息 博弈论 supply chain management coordination asymmetric information game theory
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